Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning for autonomous cyber defence have resulted in agents that can successfully defend simulated computer networks against cyber-attacks. However, many of these agents would need retraining to defend networks with differing topology or size, making them poorly suited to real-world networks where topology and size can vary over time. In this research we introduce a novel set of Topological Extensions for Reinforcement Learning Agents (TERLA) that provide generalisability for the defence of networks with differing topology and size, without the need for retraining. Our approach involves the use of heterogeneous graph neural network layers to produce a fixed-size latent embedding representing the observed network state. This representation learning stage is coupled with a reduced, fixed-size, semantically meaningful and interpretable action space. We apply TERLA to a standard deep reinforcement learning Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO) agent model, and to reduce the sim-to-real gap, conduct our research using Cyber Autonomy Gym for Experimentation (CAGE) Challenge 4. This Cyber Operations Research Gym environment has many of the features of a real-world network, such as realistic Intrusion Detection System (IDS) events and multiple agents defending network segments of differing topology and size. TERLA agents retain the defensive performance of vanilla PPO agents whilst showing improved action efficiency. Generalisability has been demonstrated by showing that all TERLA agents have the same network-agnostic neural network architecture, and by deploying a single TERLA agent multiple times to defend network segments with differing topology and size, showing improved defensive performance and efficiency.

Designing rewards for autonomous cyber attack and defense learning agents in a complex, dynamic environment is a challenging task for subject matter experts. We propose a large language model (LLM)-based reward design approach to generate autonomous cyber defense policies in a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-driven experimental simulation environment. Multiple attack and defense agent personas were crafted, reflecting heterogeneity in agent actions, to generate LLM-guided reward designs where the LLM was first provided with contextual cyber simulation environment information. These reward structures were then utilized within a DRL-driven attack-defense simulation environment to learn an ensemble of cyber defense policies. Our results suggest that LLM-guided reward designs can lead to effective defense strategies against diverse adversarial behaviors.

While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been proven effective across both collaborative and competitive tasks, existing algorithms often struggle to scale to large populations of agents. Recent advancements in mean-field (MF) theory provide scalable solutions by approximating population interactions as a continuum, yet most existing frameworks focus exclusively on either fully cooperative or purely competitive settings. To bridge this gap, we introduce MF-MAPPO, a mean-field extension of PPO designed for zero-sum team games that integrate intra-team cooperation with inter-team competition. MF-MAPPO employs a shared actor and a minimally informed critic per team and is trained directly on finite-population simulators, thereby enabling deployment to realistic scenarios with thousands of agents. We further show that MF-MAPPO naturally extends to partially observable settings through a simple gradient-regularized training scheme. Our evaluation utilizes large-scale benchmark scenarios using our own testing simulation platform for MF team games (MFEnv), including offense-defense battlefield tasks as well as variants of population-based rock-paper-scissors games that admit analytical solutions, for benchmarking. Across these benchmarks, MF-MAPPO outperforms existing methods and exhibits complex, heterogeneous behaviors, demonstrating the effectiveness of combining mean-field theory and MARL techniques at scale.

Popular methods in cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with partially observable environments typically allow agents to act independently during execution, which may limit the coordinated effect of the trained policies. However, by sharing information such as known or suspected ongoing threats, effective communication can lead to improved decision-making in the cyber battle space. We propose a game design where defender agents learn to communicate and defend against imminent cyber threats by playing training games in the Cyber Operations Research Gym, using the Differentiable Inter Agent Learning algorithm adapted to the cyber operational environment. The tactical policies learned by these autonomous agents are akin to those of human experts during incident responses to avert cyber threats. In addition, the agents simultaneously learn minimal cost communication messages while learning their defence tactical policies.

Fast and effective incident response is essential to prevent adversarial cyberattacks. Autonomous Cyber Defense (ACD) aims to automate incident response through Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents that plan and execute actions. Most ACD approaches focus on single-agent scenarios and leverage Reinforcement Learning (RL). However, ACD RL-trained agents depend on costly training, and their reasoning is not always explainable or transferable. Large Language Models (LLMs) can address these concerns by providing explainable actions in general security contexts. Researchers have explored LLM agents for ACD but have not evaluated them on multi-agent scenarios or interacting with other ACD agents. In this paper, we show the first study on how LLMs perform in multi-agent ACD environments by proposing a new integration to the CybORG CAGE 4 environment. We examine how ACD teams of LLM and RL agents can interact by proposing a novel communication protocol. Our results highlight the strengths and weaknesses of LLMs and RL and help us identify promising research directions to create, train, and deploy future teams of ACD agents.

In the face of evolving cyber threats such as malware, ransomware and phishing, autonomous cybersecurity defense (ACD) systems have become essential for real-time threat detection and response with optional human intervention. However, existing ACD systems rely on limiting assumptions, particularly the stationarity of the underlying network dynamics. In real-world scenarios, network topologies can change due to actions taken by attackers or defenders, system failures, or time evolution of networks, leading to failures in the adaptive capabilities of current defense agents. Moreover, many agents are trained on static environments, resulting in overfitting to specific topologies, which hampers their ability to generalize to out-of-distribution network topologies. This work addresses these challenges by exploring methods for developing agents to learn generalizable policies across dynamic network environments -- general ACD (GACD).

We analyze two open source deep reinforcement learning agents submitted to the CAGE Challenge 2 cyber defense challenge, where each competitor submitted an agent to defend a simulated network against each of several provided rules-based attack agents. We demonstrate that one can gain interpretability of agent successes and failures by simplifying the complex state and action spaces and by tracking important events, shedding light on the fine-grained behavior of both the defense and attack agents in each experimental scenario. By analyzing important events within an evaluation episode, we identify patterns in infiltration and clearing events that tell us how well the attacker and defender played their respective roles; for example, defenders were generally able to clear infiltrations within one or two timesteps of a host being exploited. By examining transitions in the environment's state caused by the various possible actions, we determine which actions tended to be effective and which did not, showing that certain important actions are between 40% and 99% ineffective. We examine how decoy services affect exploit success, concluding for instance that decoys block up to 94% of exploits that would directly grant privileged access to a host. Finally, we discuss the realism of the challenge and ways that the CAGE Challenge 4 has addressed some of our concerns.

Cyber resilience is the ability of a system to recover from an attack with minimal impact on system operations. However, characterizing a network's resilience under a cyber attack is challenging, as there are no formal definitions of resilience applicable to diverse network topologies and attack patterns. In this work, we propose a quantifiable formulation of resilience that considers multiple defender operational goals, the criticality of various network resources for daily operations, and provides interpretability to security operators about their system's resilience under attack. We evaluate our approach within the CybORG environment, a reinforcement learning (RL) framework for autonomous cyber defense, analyzing trade-offs between resilience, costs, and prioritization of operational goals. Furthermore, we introduce methods to aggregate resilience metrics across time-variable attack patterns and multiple network topologies, comprehensively characterizing system resilience. Using insights gained from our resilience metrics, we design RL autonomous defensive agents and compare them against several heuristic baselines, showing that proactive network hardening techniques and prompt recovery of compromised machines are critical for effective cyber defenses.

We introduce a novel non-cooperative game to analyse opinion formation and resistance, incorporating principles from social psychology such as confirmation bias, resource constraints, and influence penalties. Our simulation features Large Language Model (LLM) agents competing to influence a population, with penalties imposed for generating messages that propagate or counter misinformation. This framework integrates resource optimisation into the agents' decision-making process. Our findings demonstrate that while higher confirmation bias strengthens opinion alignment within groups, it also exacerbates overall polarisation. Conversely, lower confirmation bias leads to fragmented opinions and limited shifts in individual beliefs. Investing heavily in a high-resource debunking strategy can initially align the population with the debunking agent, but risks rapid resource depletion and diminished long-term influence.